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This study of how to interpret the various concepts contained in Article
9C(1) of the EC Treaty shows that ttrc Court of Justice has clarified the dis-
tinction to be made between providers of services of public interest and un-
dertakings. The decisive criterion applied by the Court is that for a body to
be regarded as an undertaking it is necessary for it to perform economic
activities. However, it has also become clear that it is not always easy to
establish whether services of public interest involve such activities. Al-
though the Court has indicated that activities based on the solidarity princi-
ple cannot be considered to be economic activities, case law on this point is
not yet firmly established. Which factors play a role in the consideration of
whether the sotdarity principle is present to an extent which precludes the
body in question from being deemed to be an undertaking, and the weight
attached to each factor is not yet clear. What must be concluded, on the ba-
sis of current case law, is that in order to answer, for example, the question
of whether organisations involved in implementing social security legisla-
tion, hospitals or universities must be deemed to be undertakings within the
meaning of Article 90, in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86, the way in
which the implementation of the relevant activities is regulated is of deci-
sive importance.
With regard to the interpretation of the term 'special or exclusive
rights', the Commission, prompted by the case law of the Court, has pro-
vided a definition in Directive 94/46, the substance of which is that special
rights exist if the number of undertakings within a specific geographic area
is limited to two or more on grounds other than objective, proportionate
and non-discriminatory criteria. A holder of a special right will therefore
always be faced with at least one competitor.
ln studying the interpretation of Article 9O(2),I lmked at the question
of to whom and when the exception referred to in that paragraph can be ap-
plicable. At first sight, the text of paragraph 2 would seem to indicate that
the exception from the prohibition contained in the Treaty rules, in par-
ticular the rules on competition, applies orily to the actions of undertakings
with a public service task. However, it can now be concluded on the basis
of the case law, that ttle Court does not only consider ttre exception to be
applicable to the actions of such undertakings themselves, but also to the
measures taken by the Member States, in obliging the undertakings to per-
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form certain activities. Furthermore, it has become clear that the Court con-
siders the exception applicable not only to breaches of Articles 85 and 86,
and of Article 90(l), in conjunction with Articles 85 and 86, but also to
breaches of other articles of the Treaty.
Ttrc scope of the exception has long been restricted by both the Com-
mission and the Court. It was only considered apptcable where the finan-
cial balance or economic viability of a public body would have been threat-
ened by the application of the rules in question and therefore the perform-
ance of its task rnt only made difficult but actually obstructed. However,
from recent judgments of the Coun in the energy cases C-157 to 160/94., it
is clear that it has rnw adopted a change of course. It is not only the finan-
cial balance or viability of the body in question which is decisive. It is suf-
ficient for the undertaking to be unable to perform its special task, as de-
fined by the obligations and the specific restrictions laid upon it. Nevenhe-
less, the Court has not yet handed down a ruling on the question of whether
the measures at issue were indeed necessary and proportionate to the per-
formance of that task.
From the judgments handed down by the Court relating to the interpre-
tation of Article 90(3), it can first be concluded that on the basis of this
provision the Commission is indeed competent o lay down general rules
which define or clarify the obligations laid upon the Member States by the
Treaty with regard to the undertakings referred to in Article 90, paragraphs
7 and 2. It has also become clear that although the Commission's compe-
tence to do so must be based on the obligations on Member States which al-
ready exist by virtue of the provisions of the Treaty, this competence also
has constitutional aspects in that the Commission can issue rules on the
way in which the Member States must comply wittr these obligations.
ln addition, the Commission may address itself to an individual Mem-
ber State by means of a decision. This competence mbraces the power to
establish that a specific government measure is incompatible with the treaty
rules and the power to indicate which measures the Member State con-
cemed has to take in order to comply with its obligarions under Community
law. The Court has compared these powers of the Commission under Arti-
cle 90(3) with those which it enjoys under Article 93 of the Treaty. In both
casqs, the Commission may act against a Member State which restricts
competition.
ln response to the question of whether if requested to issue a decision
on the basis of this article, the Commission may refuse to do so, the Court
held that the Commission has a broad discretion with regard both to the ne-
cessity to take action and to the way in which it chooses to do so. However,
exceptional circumstances in which a private individual or an association
serving the collective interests of a group of individuals may take legal ac-
tion against a refusal by
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The examination of tt
ate a legal monopoly, wl
Court no longer uses the
tion of legal monopolies i
rules. The existence of su
tenance, must be assessec
Articles 30, 34, 37, 52 aru
It can also be concluc
nance of a monopoly, whr
rules, may also conflict w
main question here is wl
situation has arisen on th,
arise if a dominant undert
or if a sinration has been <
oly is in fact obliged to a
Article 86 in conjunction
the Corbeau case gave a r
that the Court fus not cot
patible with Articles 90 ar
At the same time, Art
this context too. It has be
provided for by Article 90
undertakings and to gover
prohibited under articles <
hand, it appears from the
that the scope ofthe excel
assumed previously. Not o
public service task, but alr
may constitute justificatior
rights.
It has also become ck
posed on undertakings wir
tors investigated in Chapte
divided into five categorie
discrimination, the preven
cial functions, the impositi
high, too low or discriminr
The same rules often have
lition of the special or excl
In effect, the aim ofth
tion and thus any conflict
e clear that the Court con-
hes of Articles 85 and 86.
es 85 and 86, but also to
stricted by both the com-
pplicable where the finan-
ly would have been threat-
ud therefore the perform-
rally obstructed. However,
i cases C-157 to 160/94, it
se. It is not only the finan-
vhich is decisive. It is suf-
rrm its special task, as de-
rns laid upon it. Neverthe-
on the question of whether
I proportionate to the per-
urt relating to the interpre-
I that on the basis of this
to lay down general rules
the Member States by the
l in Article 90, paragraphs
the Commission's compe-
r Member States which al-
eaty, this competence also
on can issue rules on the
th these obligations.
elf to an individual Mem-
ce embraces the power to
rcompatible with the treaty
s the Member State con-
gations under Community
e Commission under Arti-
: 93 of the Treaty. In both
rber State which restricts
uested to issue a decision
refuse to do so, the Court
vith regard both to the ne-
[ooses to do so. However,
Cividual or an association
riduals may take legal ac-
Surnrnary 215
tion agairst a refusal by the Commission to issue a decision pursuant to
Article 90(3), may not be ruled out in advance.
The examination of the question of whether it is still permissible to cre-
ate a legal monopoly, which is the subject of Chapter 5, revealed that the
Court no longer uses the distinction between the existence and the opera-
tion of legal monopolies as the criterion for their compatibility with Treaty
rules. The existence of such monopolies, as well as their creation or main-
tenance, must be assessed in the light of the rules of the Treaty, notably of
Articles 30, 34,37, 52 and 59.
It can also be concluded from the case law that tlte creation or mainte-
nance of a monopoly, whether or not this is incompatible with other Treaty
rules, may also conllict with Article 90 in conjunction with Article 86. The
main question here is whether as a result of the govemrnent measure, a
situation has arisen on the market which is the same as that which would
arise if a dominant undertaking was to abuse its position. If that is the case,
or if a situation has been created in which the undertaking with the monop-
oly is in fact obliged to abuse its posilion, then incompatibility exists with
Article 86 in conjunction with Article 90. Although the Court's ruling in
the Corbeau case gave a different impression, later case law made it clear
that the Court fus not consider the mere creation of a monopoly as incom-
patible with Articles 90 and 86.
At the same time, Anicle 90(2) plays an increasingly important role in
this context too. It has become clear, on the one hand, that the exception
provided for by Article 90(2) may be deemed to apply both to the actions of
undertakings and to goverrrment measures, and moreover also to measures
prohibited under articles of the Treaty other than 85 and 86. On the other
hand, it appears from the Court's rulings in the energy cases (see above),
that the scope of the exception must be interpreted more broadly than was
assumed previously. Not orily the economic future of an undertaking with a
public service task, but also the way in which that task can be carried out,
may constitute justification for granting or maintaining special or exclusive
rights.
It has also become clear that the rules of conduct which must be im-
posed on undertakings with special or exclusive rights in the various sec-
tors investigated in Chapter 6 have broadly similar aims. These rules can be
divided into five categories according to their objectives: the prevention of
discrimination, the prevention of linkage between regulatory and commer-
cial functiors, the imposition of quality requirements, the prevention of too
high, too low or discriminatory prices and the prevention of cross subsidies.
The same rules often have to be maintained for a period following the abo
lition of the special or exclusive rights.
In effect, the aim of these rules is to prevent abuse of a dominant posi-
tion and thus any conflict with Article 86 of the Treaty. Nevertheless, we
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caffnt corclude that they are in fact superfluous, altlnugh Article 86 im-
poses in my oipinion an obligation to the same effect. Unlike Article 86,
which contains a prohibition, the rules contain, on the whole, positive and
more specific prescriptions, in the way that the obligation to perform cer-
tain actions is imposed in order to ensure that activities of the undertaking
conform to the norm of Article 86. This creates a greater degree of legal
certainty. The parameters of a prohibition, for instance those of a prohibi-
tion on abuse of a dominant position, are broader than the positive rules of
conduct resulting ftom a directive, which are often fairly detailed. Further-
more, positive rules lighten the burden of proof and can shift it more in the
direction of the undertaking being sued. In addition, the directives also
contain provisiurs which facilitate the monitoring of cunpliance (the pro-
visions on co6t attribution systems and on making public certain conditions
goveming access, for irxtance). If it is not clear precisely how costs are
calculated, it is very difficult to ascertain whether there is any cross sub-
sidy. The same applies to the transparency of conditions goveming access.
If there is no such transparency, an undertaking which is suffering from
discrimination will be unable to establish or prove that it is being discrimi-
nated against and will be unable to take any action.
It can therefore be concluded that the rules of conduct contained in the
directives in fact strenglhen the effect of the prohibition contained in Arti-
cle 86 and furthermore improve the monitoring of compliance. One might
wonder, indeed, whether similar rules should not be imposed on undertak-
ings which have a 'normal dominant' position in the market. The effective-
ness of Article 86 would seem generally limited in the absence of rules on
the transparency of supply or access, and the same is true of provisions on
the keeping ofproper, separate financial records.
ln addition to the rules of conduct contained in these directives, the
rules which derive from Article 85 and 86, and the regulation on the control
of concentratiorn ('Merger Regulation') itself, apart from the exception laid
down in Article 90(2), also apply of course to these undertakings. With the
Guidelines and Draft Notice for the telecommunications ector and the No-
tice for the postal sector, the Commission attempted to create greater clarity
for the undertakings concerned as to exactly which rules of conduct they
should adhere to on the basis of these provisions. Policy with regard to
these undertakings, which is based on Articles 85 and 86 and the Merger
Regulation, demonstrates that in applying these rules, the Commission can
- and indeed does - take account of the special problems to which these
undertakings may give rise.
The Commission looks favourably on cooperation agreements as such,
even where undertakings with special or exclusive rights are involved. It
does however impose the condition ttrat such an agreement does not ex-
clude competition. To this end, conditions are imposed on the undertakings.
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The decisions in the Atlas and Phoenix cases in particular show how much
attention the Commission pays to this issue. If we take a closer look at the
conditions imposed by the Commission in these decisions, we see that they
are the same as two of the five rules of conduct contafurcd in the ONP di-
rectives and the liberalisation directives: they aim to prevent discrimination
and cross subsidisation. If ttre Member States have fulfilled the obligations
arising from the ONP or liberalisation directives, therefore, undertakings
with special or exclusive rights in those sectors on their territory are
obliged by national legislation to comply with the rules of conduct referred
to above. The decision in the BT-MCI case shows that in those situations
the Commission no longer considers it necessary to impose these rules
again in the form of conditions for the granting of an exemption.
The form of abuse which has occupied the Commission the most so far
in relation to these undertakings is the refusal to supply an essential facility.
ln cases where the undertaking having the essential facility is also active in
a downstream market, the undertaking being refused the facility is of
course also being discriminated against in relation to the branch or subsidi-
ary of the owner of the essential facility. In this connection, the Commis-
sion has made it clear that it bears in mind the question of whether there is
sufficient capacity available. It assumes that the operator of an essential fa-
cility which is also active on the downstream market must in fact behave as
if the latter were not the case. It may make absolutely no distinction be-
tween its own subsidiary and the latter's competitors.
In practice, the Commission has not issued any decisions on the basis
of Article 86 with regard to cross subsidisation by undertakings with spe-
cial or exclusive rights. As the Commission remarked in the Guidelines on
the application of competition rules in the telecommunications sector, cross
subsidisation does not qualify as an abuse in all cases. It is thus justified for
an undertaking with exclusive rights to offset the higher costs which it in-
curs in offering a service in thinly populated areas against the profits it
makes in densely populated parts.
Exactly as with other forms of abuse, cross subsidisation only consti-
tutes abuse if it entails substantial negative effects on the structure of the
market and if there is no objective justification for the behaviour in ques-
tion. Such negative effects will be present if activities taking place on other
markets than the market in which the undertaking has a dominant position
are subsidised. ln such a situation there will be artificially low prices being
charged on the second market and the competition structure will be dis-
torted. In this connection it may be noted that it will be difficult to show
that prices whereby the costs associated with production or services on the
downstream market are not fully passed on are not too low.
Decisions regarding the control of concentrations how that approval
for a concentrative joint venture being set up by undertakings with special
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or exclusive rights will depend on there being a genuine chance that other
undertakings will be able to enter the market where the joint venture is ac-
tive. In my view, the Commission can be expected to accept rules of con-
duct aimed at the parent companies in order to prevent joint ventures ob-
taining a dominant position.
With regard to the short description in Chapter 8 of a number of devel-
opments in this area in the Netherlands, it can fust be stated that Section
41, subsection 3 of the Dutch Competition Act (Mededingingswet) consid-
ers the possibility of taking account of the special position of undertakings
with a public service task in monitoring concentration. While the choice at
European level has been for a sectoral approach to the problem, the Cohen
working group has studied the scope for a generic approach. The Govem-
ment believes that the proposals the working goup has made require fur-
ther elaboration, and suggests that experience should first be gained with
specific areas.
It should also be noted that at European level, unlike in the Nether-
lands, no effort has been made to prohibit undertakings with exclusive
rights from developing subsidiary activities, although every effort is made
to prevent distortion of competition. In practice, it appears that the greatest
impact is expected from the introduction of competition on the privileged
market and therefore from the abolition of exclusive rights. The Commis-
sion has brought this about in the telecommunications sector. Whether the
same thing will happen in other sectors and whether the abolition of exclu-
sive rights there too will be considered justified cannot at present be pre-
dicted. Much will depend on the extent to which the Member States will be
prepared to go along with the Commission in this.
Finally, it may be concluded that the search at both European and na-
tionai level for the best way of carrying out public service tasks and of
achieving balance between protection and competition is not yet over in
most sectors. The performance of public service tasks may in some cases
justify the granting of monopoly rights for a time, but in others it will not.
In granting or retaining such rights the Member States will in any event
have to take account of the justification requirement, and of the fact that the
requirement of proportionality will have to be satisfied. In those cases in
which special or exclusive rights may be retained, it may be that under-
takings holding such rights will have to be subject to additional rules of
conduct which prescribe in a more detailed way than the generally valid
competition rules the behaviour of those undertakings on the market, in or-
der to counter as far as possible the negative impact which may be the re-
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